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Stock For Stock And Cash
Taxpayer owned all of the outstanding stock of a Nevada corpora-
tion. In 1952 he entered into an agreement by which he was to
receive cash plus shares in a New York corporation in exchange
for all of his Nevada stock.' Taxpayer reported the transaction as
one which qualified under the reorganization provisions of the 1939
Internal Revenue Code' and paid a tax at capital gain rates only on
the "boot"' received. The Commissioner proposed a deficiency,
claiming that the entire gain was taxable.4 The Ninth Circuit agreed
with the Commissioner.' In order to resolve a conflict which existed
between the holding of the Seventh Circuit in Howard v. Com-
missioner and the holding of the Ninth Circuit in the principal case,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 Held: The exchange of all
the stock in one corporation for cash and stock in another is not
a reorganization under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code definitions;
therefore, the gain realized on the exchange is to be fully recognized.
Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 337 (1961).
Under the general rule of federal taxation, upon the sale or
exchange of property the entire amount of gain or loss is recognized.'
If the property is a capital asset,' the sale is accorded capital gains
' The taxpayer received 82,375 shares valued at $1,235,625 plus $3,000,000 in cash. The
amount of stock he received was less than 80% of the outstanding stock of the New York
corporation.
aInt. Rev. Code of 1939, §5 112(b) (3), -(c) (I). Similar provisions are found in Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 354(a), 356(a).
a "Boot" was defined in this context as that "other property" or dissimilar property ac-
companying the major or principal property. In the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations,
"boot" is referred to as "other property." See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 356; Treas. Regs.
§§ 1.356-1 to -3 (1955). The Ninth Circuit in Commissioner v. Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669,
670 (9th Cir. 1960), referred to the cash received as the "so-called 'boot.'"4 The Tax Court, following its earlier decision in Luther Bonham, 33 B.T.A. 1100
(1936), and the opinion of the Seventh Circuit in Howard v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 943
(7th Cir. 1956), held that the gain was recognizable only to the extent of the boot re-
ceived. 32 T.C. 646 (1959).
'286 F.2d 669, 675 (9th Cir. 1960).
6238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956). In this case the acquiring corporation obtained 80.19%
of the stock of the acquired corporation in a stock-for-stock exchange. The remaining
19.81% of the outstanding shares was acquired for cash. Petitioner Howard received only
stock in exchange for his shares. The Commissioner proposed that Howard realized gain
which was to be fully recognized. The Court ruled, however, that the gain was not to be
recognized since the taxpayer received only stock.
7366 U.S. 923 (1961).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 1002; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(a). The principal
case arose under the 1939 Code. All code section references used here will be to the 1939
Code unless otherwise indicated.
'See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221, 1231.
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treatment ° Through the years, however, Congress has excepted
from taxation certain otherwise taxable exchanges. 1 The first such
exceptions were enacted in 1918. They provided for the non-
recognition of gain or loss realized in connection with reorganiza-
tions of corporations under the various state merger or consolidation
statutes only if the stock exchanged had the same par or face value."
In 1921, this latter limitation was removed. 3 However, the stock
received had to be issued by a corporation which was either a party
to or the direct result of the reorganization.' The Revenue Act of
1924" further expanded the definitions, which have remained practi-
cally unchanged since that time.
Under the 1939 Code, there is no recognition of gain or loss
realized on the exchange of shares in a corporation which is a party
to a reorganization." That Code enumerates six transactions which
qualify as reorganizations. 7 Moreover, section 112 (c) (1)0 permits
' See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1201.
"The exceptions as they now stand in the 1954 Code provide for the following:(1) exchanges of property for like kind held either for trade or business or as an invest-
ment, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1031(a); (2) exchanges of property for stock, Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 1032; (3) exchanges of common stock for common stock, or the ex-
change of preferred stock for preferred stock in the same corporation, Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 1036; (4) certain involuntary conversions, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 1033; (5)
sale or exchange of a residence, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1034; and (6) exchanges pursuant
to corporate reorganizations, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §5 354, 361.
'a Revenue Act of 1918, § 202(b), ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1060, provided that no gain or
loss should be deemed to occur when, in connection with a reorganization, merger, or con-
solidation of a corporation, a person received in place of stock or securities owned by him
new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value.
"3Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c), ch. 136, 42 Stat. 230.
14 Ibid.
"Revenue Act of 1924, § 203(h) (1), 43 Stat. 253.
'°Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (3) provides:
Stock for stock on reorganization. No gain or loss shall be recognized if
stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pur-
suance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities
in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization.
'
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(g) (1) provides:
The term "reorganization" means (A) a statutory merger or consolidation,
or (B) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part
of its voting stock, of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least
80 per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of
another corporation, or (C) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange
solely for all or a part of its voting stock, of substantially all of the properties
of another corporation, but in determining whether the exchange is solely for
voting stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the
other or the fact that property acquired is subject to a liability, shall be dis-
regarded, or (D) a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to
another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its
shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are
transferred, or (E) a recapitalization, or (F) a mere change in identity, form,
or place of organization, however effected.
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(c) (1) provides:
Gains from exchanges not solely in kind. (1) If an exchange would be
within the provisions of subsection (b) (1), (2), (3), or (5), or within the
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the receipt of boot 9 and limits recognized gain to the amount of
boot received in transactions which qualify under sections 112 (b) ( 1 ),
(2), (3), or (5). Courts have strictly interpreted the exceptions by
requiring the taxpayer to follow closely the statutory provisions"
and by enunciating three additional criteria which must be satisfied."
provisions of subsection (1), of this section if it were not for the fact that
the property received in exchange consists not only of property permitted by
such paragraph or by subsection (1) to be received without the recognition of
gain, but also of other property or money, then the gain, if any, to the re-
cipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such
money and the fair market value of such other property.
See note 3 supra for a definition of "boot."
20 See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942), in which a corpora-
tion with a large indebtedness defaulted in interest payments on outstanding bonds. Pursuant
to a plan of reorganization, a new corporation was formed which acquired the assets of the
defaulting corporation in exchange for voting common stock and class A and class B stock
purchase warrants. Most of the common stock was to go to the bondholders; a small por-
tion, together with the class A warrants, was to be issued to the unsecured creditors. Non-
participating security holders received cash obtained by a loan from a bank. The loan in-
debtedness was assumed by the new corporation. The Court held that such a transaction
was not a tax-free reorganization, because it was not an exchange "solely" for voting stock.
"' The first test to appear in judicial opinions was the "continuity of interest" test,
which requires that the parties have a continuing proprietary interest. The following three
cases are exemplary of the application of this test.
In Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933), there was a
sale by one corporation to another corporation of all its property for money paid partly in
cash and the remainder in installments evidenced by promissory notes. The Court held the
notes were not securities for statutory purposes. "Certainly, we think that to be within the
exemption the seller must acquire an interest in the affairs of the purchasing company more
definite than that incident to ownership of its short-term purchase-money notes." 287 U.S.
at 470.
Similarly, in Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940), in which one corporation trans-
ferred all its property to another corporation for cash and bonds, the Court held that the
bonds did not satisfy the statutory requirements. "Where consideration is . . . part cash
and part such bonds, we think it cannot be said that the transferor retains any proprietary
interest in the enterprise. On the contrary, he becomes a creditor of the transferee .... "
308 U.S. at 421. See also Silverson, The Meaning of Le Tulle v. Scofield, 18 Taxes 492
(1940).
However, in Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942), in
which a creditors' committee of a bankrupt corporation arranged a sale of the assets and
received stock in the purchasing corporation, the Court found that there was a continuity
of interest, since the transfer was merely a shift in ownership of the equity.
The second criterion, the "business purposes" test, was developed in Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935). There, a taxpayer wanted to get possession (so she could sell at a
profit) of stock held by her wholly owned corporation M. In order to avoid having the
distribution to her taxed as a dividend, she formed corporation A and had M transfer the
stock to A, all of A's stock going to the taxpayer. The taxpayer then liquidated A, sold
the stock, and paid a capital gain tax on the net gain. The Court held that the transaction
was
a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a
disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and accomplish-
ment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to re-
organize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of cor-
porate shares to the petitioner. 293 U.S. at 469.
See also 48 Harv. L. Rev. 852 (1935).
The third non-statutory requirement applied by the courts has been termed the "step
transaction" test. Under this doctrine, the court views all of the transfer and transactions
made by the taxpayer as a whole. Although the individual steps may qualify under the exact
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The effect of these tests is to require a "continuity of interest" of
the parties and a "business purpose" in the transaction. Also, under
the "step transaction" requirement, the plan, when viewed as a
whole, must meet the reorganization requirements.
In the principal case, it was undisputed that the transaction was
not a "reorganization" as defined in section 112 (g) (1) (B), because
the exchange in question did not involve solely voting stock. It was
also conceded that the transaction failed to come within section
112(b) (3), since the exchange was not "in pursuance of [a] plan
of reorganization." However, Taxpayer, arguing in line with the
Howard case,"2 claimed that he could limit his gain to the amount
of boot received according to the provisions of section 112 (c) (1).
He contended that section 112(c) (1) authorized the assumption
that the exchange constituted a type B reorganization, since it would
have been such had it not been for the boot. He argued that it was
necessary and proper to look to section 112 (b) (3) after omitting
the cash payment received in the transaction. The Commissioner
urged that section 112(c) (1) modified section 112(b) (3) only
when the provisions of section 112 (b) (3) would have otherwise
been applicable had it not been for the boot received. Since section
112(b) (3) also required the exchange to be "in pursuance of [a]
plan of reorganization," section 112(c) (1) did not apply unless
there was such a plan of reorganization, as defined in section
112(g) (1)."4 The Court stated that
to indulge [in] such an assumption [that the taxpayer qualified for the
benefits of §112(c) (1), notwithstanding the lack of a plan of re-
organization] would actually be to permit the negation of Congress'
carefully composed definition and use of "reorganization" in those
subsections, and to permit nonrecognition of gains on what are, in
reality, only sales, the full gain from which is immediately recognized
and taxed under the general rule. . .. "
statutory provisions, if the plan taken as a whole fails to meet the reorganization require-
ments, non-recognition is denied. As an example see Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d
732 (4th Cir. 1938). Corporation M desired to acquire the operating assets of Corporation
E but not its large investments. E therefore organized Corporation X and transferred to it all
of the investment assets. X issued all of its stock to E, which distributed it to E shareholders.
E then transferred its remaining assets to M for stock of M; E was dissolved and the M
stock was distributed to E shareholders. Each step taken individually was tax-free; however,
the court looked at all of the transactions as a whole and taxed the reorganization. See also
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 835 (1959); Grede Foundries, Inc. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Wis.
1962).
22 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956); see discussion note 6 supra.
2332 T.C. 646, 650 (1959).




However, the Court made it clear that its opinion should not be
interpreted to mean that section 112 (c) (1) was without purpose
or function; but rather, that section would have applied if some
part of the property exchanged actually had met the particular
description contained in the applicable section of the Code."
The instant case was cited and followed in a recent Tax Court
case 7 involving a similar transaction that was decided under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The dissenting opinion attempted
to distinguish the new case on the ground that there the "boot"
received was only $27 .36 .s The majority refused to accept that dis-
tinction and stated: "[T]he Supreme Court [in Turnbow] empha-
sized the word 'solely' . . . , and we believe that that requirement is
to be literally construed."3
Writing for the majority in the instant case, Mr. Justice Whittaker
stated that the Court's holding "determines this case and [that] is
all we decide."'" This limiting language, coupled with the Court's
statement that section 112 (c) (1) was applicable when the property
exchanged met the particular description contained in the Code
provisions, indicates that a different result may be anticipated if a
different type of reorganization is used. For example, if the corpora-
tions involved in the instant case had been chartered in states which
had corporation laws providing for statutory mergers or consolida-
tions," then a type A reorganization, "a statutory merger or con-
solidation," under the 1939 and 1954 Codes3 would have been pos-
sible. Assuming that such a plan of reorganization were used in a
case involving facts similar to those in the instant case, then, follow-
ing the Court's analysis of the problem, one could forceably argue
that a taxpayer should report his gain only to the extent of the
cash received.
Joseph Bin ford
21 Id. at 344.
2'Richard M. Mills, 39 T.C. No. 36 (1962). G Corporatoin acquired all of the stock
of three corporations controlled by petitioners in exchange for a part of its stock (valued
at $27,912.50) and $27.36 in cash in lieu of fractional shares of stock.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 354(a), 356(a), 368(a) (1) (B).
2939 T.C. No. 36 (1962).
30 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
a2 See, e.g., art. 5.07 of the Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. (1956).




Partnership and Partner as Insiders
Plaintiff stockholder on behalf of his corporation sued an invest-
ment banking partnership and one of its partners who was a direc-
tor of the corporation. The suit was brought under section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' to recover all profits realized
from the purchase and sale within six months of some of the cor-
poration's stock. There was no evidence that the partnership had
purchased the stock pursuant to any inside information or that the
partnership had designated the director-partner to represent the
partnership's interests on the board. The director-partner was un-
aware of the partnership's purchase. After learning of it, he orally
disclaimed all interest in any potential profits. Held: inter alia, (1)
Section 16(b) does not apply to a partnership simply because a
partner is a corporate director; (2) a partner who is a director
realizes only his proportional share of partnership profits, is liable
only for that amount, and his waiver of any interest in the trans-
action is ineffective. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).'
Prior to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an insider of a com-
pany listed on a stock exchange was relatively free to use his position
to his personal advantage, since the common law actions of deceit
and misrepresentation were inadequate remedies for the sheep who
were ultimately fleeced through the media of the impersonal national
'Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his re-
lationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such se-
curity was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously con-
tracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit
may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction
by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and
in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter;
but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such
profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any trans-
action where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the pur-
chase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any trans-
action or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may
exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection. 48 Stat.
896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
'The opinions of the lower federal courts are found in 173 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) and 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960).
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exchange.' Since the passage of section 16(b) "for the purpose of
preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained"4 by an officer, director, or ten per cent stockholder, such an
insider has had little incentive to purchase and sell or sell and pur-
chase equity securities of his corporation within periods of less than
six months, because under that section of the Act any profits realized
by him may be recovered by the corporation. If the corporation fails
to sue within sixty days after request or fails to prosecute the suit
diligently, the owner of any equity security of the corporation may
litigate in its behalf.' All recovery goes to the corporate treasury,
and the shareholder who brings the suit can expect at best only a
generous allowance for attorney's fees.' The burden of evidence in
a suit under 16 (b) is considerably less stringent than under the com-
mon law actions, since the subjective intent of the insider or the
actual use of inside information is immaterial.! Even though the
purpose of the section is to prevent the use of information obtained
by an insider, difficulties of proof have necessitated imposition of
liability independent of any such use.
In Smolowe v. Delendo, Inc., the first section 16(b) case to reach
the courts, the Second Circuit stated that it considered the legisla-
tive purpose was "to squeeze all possible profits out of stock trans-
actions, and thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent any
conflict between the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director,
or stockholder and the faithful performance of his duty."' In the
Smolowe case this strict standard9 of statutory interpretation was
3 See Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16
of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 133, 143-52 (1939), for a comparison of
16(b) and the common law.
448 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958). For general treatments of 5 16,
see Cole, Insiders' Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147
(1958); Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L.
Rev. 385, 612 (1953); Comment, 27 Texas L. Rev. 840 (1949).
5 Ibid.
'Smolowe v. Delendo, Inc., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 751
(1951); see Cole, supra note 4, at 185; Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair
Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 468, 479 (1947).
748 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. S 78p(b) (1958); see Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d
840 (2d Cir. 1959); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1958); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951). In the Gratz case, the court said: "On the other hand it is manifest that the
intent of the fiduciary cannot be the test; first, because he generally has no ascertainable
intent; and second, because that would open the door even more widely to the evil in
question." 187 F.2d at 51. See also Smolowe v. Delendo, Inc., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 751 (1951).
' Smolowe v. Delendo, Inc., supra note 7, at 239.
'Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959) (referring to Smolowe v. Delendo,
Inc., supra note 7, and Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951)). In the Adler case it was stated:
These prior holdings do not answer the problem presented here, but they
[Vol. 17
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applied in the adoption of a formula for computing the amount of
profits realized. 0 Rejecting (1) an ear-marking of securities theory,11
(2) the income tax methods of inventory," and (3) the average
of purchases and average of sales prices," the Second Circuit adopted
the "maximum profit possible" rule ' from which no court has ever
deviated." An insider is not allowed to minimize his profits and,
therefore, his liability by setting off losses against gains from dealings
in a particular security." Likewise, in deciding whether a particular
transaction is a "purchase," the courts have considered whether that
transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the specula-
tion intended to be prevented by section 16(b)." Along the same
line, liability has been imposed on a defendant who sold stock ac-
quired before he became a director within six months from the
acquisition date;" in another case liability was imposed upon a de-
fendant who was not technically an officer."' Prior to the instant case
the vast majority of the decisions of United States Courts of Appeal
applied a rule of strict (anti-insider) construction to section 16(b).
One notable exception was Rattner v. Lehman." In that case, on
almost the same facts as those in the principal case, the Second
Circuit held the partner-director liable for only his proportional
share of the profits made by the partnership and did not hold the
partnership liable for any amount. Rattner was followed in the
present case without re-examination by the Second Circuit, and it
was cited by the Supreme Court.
In holding that "it was Thomas, -not Lehman Brothers as an en-
tity, that was the director of Tide Water"" the Supreme Court gave
do show a pattern of this court's view that the purpose of the statute is re-
medial, rather than penal, and that it must be strictly construed in favor of
the corporation and against any person who makes profit dealing in the cor-
poration stock. 267 F.2d at 846-47.





14 "The only rule whereby all possible profits can be surely recovered is that of lowest
price in, highest price out-within six months-as applied by the district court." Id. at 239.
" If the remedial purpose of section 16(b) is to be accomplished, there appears to be
no alternative. Cook & Feldman, supra note 4, at 614.
"'Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
'
7 Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1958);
see also Comment, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the Exchange
Act, 59 Yale L.J. 510, 513 (1950).
"Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
"9Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
20193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952); see 25 So. Cal. L. Rev. 475 (1952); 100 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 463 (1951) (defense of Rattner result).
2' 368 U.S. at 410.
19631
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section 16(b) a literal interpretation. Section 16(b) applies only
to a "person" who is a director. Since section 3 (a) (9)22 of the Act
provides that "'person' means ... partnership" and section 3 (a) (7) "
that "'director' means any director of a corporation or any person
performing similar functions with respect to any organization,
whether incorporated or unincorporated," the Court recognized that
a partnership could be a director under the Act. However, the ma-
jority stated that a partner-director must be "deputized" to act on
behalf of his partnership before 16(b) liability will apply to the
entity itself.2" Unfortunately, the Court did not define "deputized,"
and it is not clear how much formal designation is required to make
the partnership liable. The dissent took a contrary approach, assert-
ing that "formal designation was no more significant than informal
approval."'" This view is more in line with the previous cases which
strictly construe 16(b) in favor of liability " and which approach
the problem from a broad perspective applying public policy reasons
for liability. It is obvious that the dissent realized that the effect of
the majority's holding might be to encourage such insider specula-
tion by other investment banking partnerships.
The limited application of 16(b) to the partner-director and the
refusal to apply 16(b) to the partnership do not foster the purpose
of the Act." It is difficult to say that Congress intended such a re-
sult. The practical effect of this decision, as stated by the dissent, is
to allow "all but one partner to share in the feast which the one
places on the partnership table. They in turn can offer feasts to him
in the 99 other companies of which they are directors."'" The
startling fact about the decision is that immunity from liability is
given to those partnerships which are most likely to have inside in-
formation and most able to use it to the best advantage.' An argu-
248 Star. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1958).
248 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (7) (1958).
24 The theory of "deputization" comes from a concurring opinion by Judge Learned
Hand in Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1952). The majority opinion and
concurring judges in the Second Circuit disagreed with the dictum, but the Supreme Court
indicated possible approval. Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1960). No court
has given a satisfactory definition of "deputization" in applying the term to section 16(b)
liability.
2' 368 U.S. at 415.
20 See cases cited notes 7, 9 supra.
27 See note 1 supra for a quotation of section 16(b).
28 368 U.S. at 420; see Note, Second Circuit Limits Insider-Partner's 16(b) Liability,
14 Stan. L. Rev. 192, 198 (1961). It was pointed out that "Lehman Brothers has partners
on 100 boards." 368 U.S. at 414. See also Comment, Securities Regulation: Insider Status
in Legal Fiction and Financial Fact-A Proposed Revision to Section 16(b), 50 Calif. L.
Rev. 500, 511 (1962).2 9
"[T]he investment banking-corporation alliances are consciously constructed so as to
increase the profits of the bankers." 368 U.S. at 415.
[Vol. 17
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ment in support of the result of the case is that the petitioner-
plaintiff did not prove the allegations in his complaint and, therefore,
was not entitled to recover. The complaint alleged that "Lehman
Brothers [the partnership] 'deputed . . . Thomas, to represent its
interests as a director on the Tide Water Board of Directors,'" and
that insider profits were made because director-partner Thomas "by
reason of his special and inside knowledge of the affairs of Tide
Water, advised and caused the defendants, Lehman Brothers, to pur-
chase and sell" the stock.3" The trial court found that the plaintiff
had not proved either of his allegations. 1 However, liability should
not rest on "formal deputization" to represent the partnership, since
that act would be almost impossible to prove and it is not a pre-
quisite to liability under the statute. The fact that plaintiff alleged
but did not prove actual use of inside information should be of no
consequence because the law is well established that actual use of
information is immaterial. The only practical way to prevent the
use of inside information is with a statute which does not require
proof of actual use.
With respect to the amount realized by the individual insider, the
Supreme Court also rejected the stockholder's contention that the
director-partner realized the entire amount of profits taken in the
name of the partnership. The act requires that an insider must dis-
gorge all profits "realized by him." Unfortunately, there is no pre-
cise judicial or legislative definition of "realized" as it is used in
16(b). However, under section 51 of the New York Partnership
Law, which is identical with section 25 of the Uniform Partnership
Act, the partners are co-owners in all partnership property, which
of course includes proceeds from the sale of equity securities. The
partners were then co-owners of the profits realized in the instant
transaction. However, the Court rejected the reference to local
partnership law and refused to hold that the insider realized all the
profits. Instead, in by-passing an excellent opportunity to clear up
the confusion on this point by a precise definition of "realized," the
majority simply declared: "It would be nothing but a fiction to say
that Thomas 'realized' all the profits earned by the partnership of
which he was a member. It was not error to refuse to hold Thomas
liable for profits he did not make." (Emphasis added.)" By hold-
ing that the partner-director was liable for any amount, the Court
admitted that he was an insider, that he had entered into a trans-
30 368 U.S. at 405.
31 173 F. Supp. 590, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
32 See cases cited note 7 supra.
33 368 U.S. at 414.
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action prohibited by the statute, and that his oral disclaimer of any
interest in the transaction was ineffective to protect him from all
liability. However, by holding that the partner-director is liable for
only the amount of his interest in the partnership profit on this
transaction, the Court is softening the application of the "maximum
profits possible" theory. 4 The logical result of the case is that the
larger the firm, the smaller any one partner's liability is likely to be.
This is the first Supreme Court case under section 16(b). Al-
though the fact situation seemingly called for the imposition of
maximum liability, the Court chose to follow one of those rare
court of appeals cases " which had construed 16(b) in favor of
the insider. Under the theory of the present case, investment banking
partnerships are now in a strategic position to realize maximum profits
and to incur only minimum liabilities for inside manipulations in
equity securities. Moreover, in future litigation against director-
partners, the courts must struggle with the theory of "deputiza-
tion," which the Supreme Court impliedly accepted but did not
clearly define. That theory is an ineffective weapon against insider
speculation because of the difficulty in proving that a director-
partner has been "deputized." In short, the Court did not follow the
policy of the statute and adopt the most effective deterrent to in-
sider manipulations, which in this case would have required holding
the partnership liable as a director."6 Finally, as a very serious indirect
manifestation, there is the further possibility that this decision may
weaken the strict construction of the statute previously applied by
the lower federal courts in other 16(b) problems.
William M. Boyd
Service of Process-Foreign Corporations-Carrying on
Business Within State Through Subsidiary
Defendant, Curtis Publishing Company, was a Pennsylvania cor-
poration. An alleged libelous article in one of Defendant's maga-
zines was distributed in Kansas by Defendant's national distributor,
a wholly owned subsidiary. The distributor purchased magazines
4 See note 14 supra accompanying text.
"5 Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952) ; see discussion note 24 supra.
""Both the petitioner and the Commission contend on policy grounds that the Lehman
partnership should be held liable even though it is neither a director, officer, nor a 10%
stockholder." 368 U.S. at 410-11. A more plausible argument is that since the language of
the statute does not preclude the partnership from being a director, public policy demands
that the partnership be held liable as a director. The latter statement does not require
judicial legislation as does the former.
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from Defendant to fill subscription orders and remitted payments
to Defendant. Defendant paid the distributor a commission on the
orders. The distributor also purchased newsstand copies from De-
fendant at an agreed price for delivery to points designated by the
distributor; the distributor received credit from Defendant for un-
sold copies. Finally, the distributor was required to use its best efforts
to advertise Defendant's publications, and for so doing it was re-
imbursed by Defendant. Defendant maintained no office or personnel
in Kansas; the distributor had an office in Wichita. Service of process
was allegedly made on Defendant by service on the Secretary of
State in accordance with a Kansas statute.! After the suit was re-
moved to federal court on grounds of diversity, Defendant moved
to quash the service. Held: The activities of a wholly owned, but
independent subsidiary acting as agent of a parent corporation
within a state constitute "doing business" by the parent for purposes
of service of process in that state. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Cassel,
302 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1962).
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennoyer v.
Neff,' the scope of a state's jurisdiction over nonresident individuals
and foreign corporations has been greatly expanded. s By an evolu-
tionary process, the Court has accepted and then rejected "consent"
and "presence" as standards for measuring the extent of a state's
judicial power over foreign corporations.4 At the present time, in
order for a state to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam
when he is not present within the forum, the courts require only
that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum
state so that the maintenance of the suit does not violate due process,
i.e., that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
are not offended."' However, it is essential that a defendant purpose-
'Kan. Gen. Star. Ann. 5 17-509 (1949). The material portions of the statute provide:
In the event of any foreign corporation doing business within the state of
Kansas, and failing to appoint the secretary of state as agent upon whom
service of summons or other process can be had . . . any person having any
cause of action against such foreign corporation, which cause of action arose
in Kansas out of the said foreign corporation's doing business within the state
of Kansas, may file suit against such foreign corporation . . . and service of
summons or any process upon the secretary of state shall be sufficient to war-
rant the rendition of personal judgment against said corporation.
Since the statute does not define "doing business," the court concluded that the term must
be given a practical definition consonant with the constitutional requirements of due process.
a In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), the Court held that a state court could not
acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant merely by service of process on him outside
the forum state or by publication within the forum state.
'See Comment, Expanding Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 37 Cornell L.Q.
458 (1952).4 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
'International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In cases involving service
under a state statute, the particular statute must be carefully examined because the broadened
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fully invoke the benefits and the protection of the laws of the forum
state by conducting activities within its bounds! The Supreme Court
has given the following three reasons for thus expanding the juris-
diction of state courts: (1) there have been large increases in in-
terstate commercial transactions and vast improvements in trans-
portation and communications;" (2) it is good policy to permit the
enforcement of small or moderate claims, since individual claimants
frequently cannot afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign
forum;' and (3) if a corporation exercises the privilege of con-
ducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protec-
tion of the laws of that state and, accordingly, should assume certain
local obligations.!
To date, no decision has promulgated definite standards which
will determine if "due process" has been satisfied."0 Indeed, whether
there is due process of law must depend upon the quality and nature
of the corporate activity vis-a-vis the state's interest in the fair and
orderly administration of its laws;. thus, the facts of each individual
case will determine if a corporation is subject to a state's judicial
power."2 One of the causes of the confusion and lack of harmony in
the cases is that the test of "doing business" has been applied for
concept of "doing business" applied in International Shoe does not automatically widen the
statute's definition of "doing business," but merely permits such enlargement. Ackerley v.
Commercial Credit Co., III F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1953).
"In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), a nonresident trustee had conducted
no activity within the forum state, and because he was made an indispensible party to the
action by a Florida statute, it was ruled that the state court had no jurisdiction to consider
the matter. In this opinion the Court did not discard the concept of territorial limitations
on state power; however, it did not question the validity of the "minimum contact-fair
treatment" rule of the International Shoe case, supra note 5.
7International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
gRosenburg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
'°Westcott-Alexander, Inc. v. Dailey, 264 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1959).
"Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Much confusion has
resulted from the failure to distinguish between those cases in which the corporation is
"generally doing business" within the state (such as in the Perkins case) and those in which
the corporation is "doing business" within the meaning of a particular statute. In the latter
class of cases, the contact of the corporation with the state must be directly related to
the cause of action; whereas, in the former, the corporation will become subject to juris-
diction irrespective of the contact with the state. The most definite guideposts for deciding
whether a corporation was "doing business" were set forth in Steinway v. Majestic Amuse-
ment Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949). There the court stated that it was generally
understood that to constitute "engaging in or transacting business" for purposes of personal
service, a nonresident corporation's activities within the state had to be "substantial," "con-
tinuous," and "regular," as distinguished from "casual," "single," or "isolated" acts.
" Favell-Utley Realty Co. v. Harbor Plywood Corp., 94 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
"The problem must be solved in the light of commercial actualities not in the aura of judicial
semantics." 94 F. Supp. at 99. Jurisdiction of a state court is more likely to be upheld
when a corporation commits a tort within the state than when the suit is for a non-
tortious act. Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial
Jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 249 (1959).
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three distinct legal purposes: (1) to see if a license is necessary under
the licensing statutes; (2) in fixing tax liability for corporate activi-
ties;" and (3) to determine availability for service of process.'4
Even when it has been determined that a corporation is subject to
the jurisdiction of the state court, it is still necessary to decide
whether this potential jurisdiction can be exercised, i.e., whether
there has been proper service of process on the corporation."
In the past it was generally recognized that (1) mere ownership by a
foreign corporation of a majority of the stock of a resident corporation
and (2) exercise of control by voting that stock were not sufficient
to constitute "doing business."'" The courts felt that stock ownership
alone did not make the subsidiary the representative of the foreign
parent corporation.' Hence, the courts did not permit service upon
the subsidary to constitute service upon the parent, theorizing that
the parent could have conducted such business through an indepen-
dent agency without subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of the state."
Previously, this rule was applied only when the corporate separation
was carefully maintained." The fiction of the corporate entity was
disregarded when one corporation was so organized and controlled,
and its affairs so conducted, that it was, in fact, a mere instrumen-
tality or adjunct of another corporation." In other words, when
a domestic subsidiary was acting within the state as a mere agent
for the foreign corporation, and there was no effective corporate
separation, proper service on the subsidiary would subject the parent
to the judicial powers of the state." Furthermore, service was gen-
erally approved when the non-resident corporation was organized
for the very purpose of holding and controlling the stock of a resi-
dent corporation.
With respect to foreign publishing corporations, courts have fol-
lowed traditional developments in the law of service of process."
"Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 1018, 1045 (1925):
The business which must be transacted by a foreign corporation to subject such
a corporation to taxation for doing business must show that the corporation
is "present" and "active." In order that qualification be rendered necessary,
the corporation must not only be "present" and "active," but its activity
must be "continuous."
14 Fletcher, Private Corporations S 8712 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1955).
15Ezell v. Rust Eng'r Co., 75 F. Supp. 980 (W.D.S.C. 1948). In the principal case
proper service was not questioned.
"Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949).
"
7 Peterson v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 205 U.S. 364 (1907).
" Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
"Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F.2d 623 (N.D. Ohio 1928).
21 Ibid.
" Bator v. Boosey & Hawkes, 80 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
"Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949).
2 Sonnier v. Time, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. La. 1959).
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Under the old "presence test," courts generally held that foreign
publishers were not doing business in a state if their activities
through subsidiary corporations" or wholesale newsdealers" did not
extend beyond (1) gathering and reporting news," (2) soliciting and
promoting, 7 or (3) distributing their publications within the state if
the separate corporations or newsdealers were not empowered to
bind the foreign corporation in some business transaction." Although
these rules still have a general application, since the decision in
International Shoe" courts have become more liberal in approving
citation upon foreign publishing companies. The Seventh Circuit has
ruled that the functions of a magazine publishing company obviously
include gathering materials to be printed, obtaining advertisers and
subscribers, printing, selling, and delivering the publications. Conse-
quently, if a non-resident corporation sees fit to perform any one of
these essential functions in a given jurisdiction, it necessarily is
"doing business" for purposes of service of process.2' Other courts
have not gone this far, probably because the factors in each case are
so variable2 ' that general rules are hard to determine.
The question in the principal case was whether the carefully main-
tained corporate separation was to be ignored in determining the
existence of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit held that it was when
an agency relationship was established between the parent and the
subsidiary. Although no other court has specifically stated the law
in this manner, i.e., that service upon an independent subsidiary act-
ing as agent is sufficient, it has been held that when an independent
agent is maintained in a state, service of process on that agent will
suffice for service on the principal.' The gulf between the latter
'" Creager v. P. F. Collier & Sons Co., 36 F.2d 783 (S.D. Tex. 1929).
21Insull v. New York World Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
"' Layne v. Tribune Co., 71 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
2"Cannon v. Time, Inc., 115 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1940).
2Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).
2 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), in which the activities
of from eleven to thirteen salesmen who lived in the forum state and who worked there
under the control of the foreign corporation were held sufficient to subject the corporation
to a state action to collect contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. The
Supreme Court concluded that: "Due process is satisfied by such contacts of the corporation
with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system
of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there." 326 U.S. at 317.
"°Consolidated Cosmetics v. D-A Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1951).
3 Bergold v. Commercial Nat'l Underwriters, 61 F. Supp. 639 (D. Kan. 1945).
"2See National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1948), in which the
importance of the agency relationship was emphasized by the Court's reference to Cannon
v. Cudahy, 267 U.S. 333 (1925), as authority for the proposition that: "As principal it
would have been subject to service of process through its agents; as owner of the sub-
sidiary it was not." See also Bromze v. Nardis Sportswear, 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948),
where a foreign corporation having no office or employees in New York employed an in-
dependent company there as sales agent. The sales agent, which had no authority to enter
[Vol. 17
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case and the principal case is neither deep nor wide. As previously
noted, public policy strongly favors the expansion of jurisdiction of
the courts over foreign corporations," and in instances, as exempli-
fied by the principal case, when the contacts of the subsidiary-agent
are essential to the existence of the parent, this policy would appear
to be stronger.
3 4
In interpreting the instant case, care should be taken not to extend
its rule to cases where another form of relationship, other than
principal-agent, exists between the parent and the subsidiary. The
rule announced by the court" applies only where an agency relation-
ship exists; it was not merely derived from the fact of the parent-
subsidiary status."0 The law set forth by the court is sound, but the
opinion could have been made stronger by a more definite establish-
ment of the agency relationship. 7 Within the framework of those
statutes giving the state courts jurisdiction when a foreign corpora-
tion is generally "doing business" within the state, the principal case
enunciates a new proposition of law which is merely another step
in the expanding concept of jurisdiction over foreign corporations-
a concept which should continue to grow until any corporation with
the slightest contact with a state will be answerable in that state
for its activities there." W. Wiley Doran
into contracts, received its compensation in the form of commissions and paid its own
expenses. The court held that the defendant foreign corporation was engaged in business
in New York. See also Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953), where Jus-
tices Black and Jackson dissented and stated that the maintenance of a regular agent to
carry on business and activity within a state was sufficient to constitute doing business within
that state. The majority opinion noted that the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 5 1391(c)
(1958), had no application to a suit which had been removed, and remanded for deter-
mination of whether the defendant was doing business within the state.
'3See text accompanying notes 7, 8, 9 supra.
"See Sonnier v. Time, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. La. 1959), in which a publisher
had no agent in Louisiana and distributed through independent purchasing distributors to
newsstands and by mail to regular subscribers. The court held that the publisher was en-
gaged in business in Louisiana, because its activities resulted in a large volume of state
business.
" The activities of a wholly-owned, but independent subsidiary acting as agent of a
parent corporation within a state constitute "doing business" by the parent for purposes of
service of process in that state. 302 F.2d 138.
as In Favell-Utley Realty Co. v. Harbor Plywood Corp., 94 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal.
1950), the court held that a principal-agent relationship does not follow merely from
the fact of the parent-subsidiary status.
" Two cases had previously ruled in similar circumstances that the Curtis Circulation
Co., the distributor in the principal case, was not an agent. Schmidt v. Esquire, 210 F.2d
908 (7th Cir. 1954); Moorhead v. Curtis Publishing Co., 43 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Ky. 1942).
Support for the agency relationship finding in similar circumstances is found in Fiat Motor
Co. v. Alabama Imported Cars, 292 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1961), in which the defendant
had no officers or employees within the district. However, it had a distributorship contract
substantially identical to that of the distributor in the principal case which required pro-
motion of the sales of defendant's products. The court held that the presence of the dis-
tributor in the district authorized suit in the district against the defendant manufacturer.
" The relevant Texas statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031b (Supp. 1962), does
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Taxation-Medical Expenses-Deductibility
of Lodging Expenses
Taxpayer, a lawyer, suffered four coronary occlusions in the course
of the disease atherosclerosis. Special treatment of the disease was
required during the winter months. As a regimen of medical treat-
ment, an eminent heart specialist presented two alternatives: hos-
pitalization during the winter or temporary removal to a warm
climate.' Pursuant to the latter alternative, Taxpayer with his wife
and child traveled to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and there lived in a
rented apartment during the winters of 1954 and 1955. In his income
tax returns for those years, Taxpayer deducted the entire rental
expense as a "medical care" deduction The Commissioner disallowed
not specify the minimum circumstances under which a foreign corporation is amenable
to the jurisdiction of the state courts. The case law on the question is inadequate, because
any appearance was treated as a general appearance in Texas until promulgation of a special
appearance rule in September 1962 and because most cases are removed to the federal courts.
From those cases which proceeded through the Texas courts before the enactment of art.
2031b it appears that in order to constitute doing business for purposes of jurisdiction the
foreign corporation must engage in a continuous course of business in Texas including acts
local in nature. Louisiana W.R.R. v. Conques, 10 S.W.2d 975 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928);
Gray Co. v. Ward, 145 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism., judgm. cor. This
requirement is a stricter test than the "minimum contact-fair treatment" rule enunciated
in the International Shoe case, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In cases construing art. 2031b, the
stricter Texas approach has been followed by the Fifth Circuit without reaching the con-
stitutional question of due process. Acme Eng'rs v. Foster Eng'r Co., 254 F.2d 259 (5th
Cir. 1958); Davis v. Asano Basan Co., 212 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1954); Robbins v. Ben-
jamin Air Rifle Co., 209 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1954); Nielsen v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 206
F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1953); Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233
(5th Cir. 1953). See also Comment, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations Under Article
2031b, 39 Texas L. Rev. 214 (1960).
With the advent of the recent amendment to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure per-
mitting special appearances in Texas after September 1, 1962, Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a, it will
be interesting to notice whether the Texas courts will continue to follow the older more
strict test or whether an adoption of the "minimum contact-fair treatment" test is on
the horizon. There appears to be no reason why the more liberal test cannot be adopted
within the framework of art. 2031b. The latter article, in § 4, contains three separate
jurisdictional provisions: a single contract provision, a single tort provision, and a residual
provision of "doing business." When the single contract provision was squarely before
a federal district court it was held unconstitutional, but the single tort provision and the
residual provision of doing business remain uncertain. See Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v.
Citroen Cars Corp., 185 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Texas 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 288
F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961). For a discussion of the application of art. 2031b to a case having
similar facts to the principal case see 16 Sw. L.J. 523, 525 (1962).
Medically, hospitalization was less desirable. Confinement for an extended period of time
with attendant inactivity would have increased the danger of recurrent attacks as a result
of "inner stress and strain," and, in addition, would have restricted the taking of much
needed mild exercise. See Robert Bilder, 33 T.C. 155, 157 (1959).
'The Commissioner was willing to accept a statement of facts most favorable to the
taxpayer; he also accepted the Tax Court's finding that the "sojourns in Fort Lauderdale
during the years at issue were not vacations; they were taken as a medical necessity and as
a primary part of necessary medical treatment of a disease .... " Robert Bilder, supra
note 1, at 156. Before the Supreme Court the Commissioner limited his argument to the
"question of deductibility vel non of the cost of lodging during a medically-necessitated
trip .... " Brief for Petitioner, p. 21.
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the deduction, contending that the rental was not a deductible
medical expense under section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 but was a nondeductible personal living expense under section
262. Held: The cost of lodging incurred while temporarily away
from home on a medically necessitated trip is not deductible as a
"medical care" expense under section 213 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499 (1962).
Personal living expenses including lodging, food, transportation,
and medical care were nondeductible under the first income tax
laws.3 In 1942, the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 was amended by
the addition of section 23 (x), which provided for the deduction
of expenses incurred for medical care "not otherwise compensated
for by insurance."' Another section specifically disallowed all "per-
sonal, living, or family expenses, except extraordinary medical ex-
penses deductible under section 23 (x)."' The term "medical care"
was defined as including "amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose
of affecting any structure or function of the body (including
amounts paid for accident or health insurance),"' but no greater
specificity was indicated. Treasury Regulations promulgated pur-
suant to section 23(x) provided that travel expenses could be a
proper medical expense if proved to have been incurred during
"travel primarily for and essential to the rendition of the medical
services or to the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental
defect or illness. . .. " In differentiating between expenditures which
were primarily "personal, living, or family expenses" and those which
'Income Tax Act of 1913, § II B, 38 Stat. 167. An exception added in 1921 and con-
tinued to date allows deduction of amounts expended for meals and lodging while traveling
away from home on business. See Revenue Act of 1921, § 214(a) (1), 42 Stat. 239; Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a) (2).
4 Revenue Act of 1942, § 127(a), 56 Stat. 825. Prior to that time Congress had not
extended the benefits of such a deduction to taxpayers, and such expenditures had been
viewed by the courts as nondeductible "personal, living, or family expenses" under § 24(a)
of the 1939 Code.
5Section 24(a) of the 1939 Code, which formerly disallowed all medical expenses as
personal, living, or family expenses, was amended to add subdivision (1), which is quoted
in the text. This amendment was added by the same act of October 20, 1941 (Section 127(b)
of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 825), that added § 23(x) to the 1939 Code.
6 Section 23 (x) of the 1939 Code, as amended in 1942, provided in part that deductions
allowed included:
Expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent. . ..
The term "medical care" as used in this subsection, shall include amounts paid
for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for
the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body (including
amounts paid for accident or health insurance).
7See Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(x)-1 (1943); cf. L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580,
583-84 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950).
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were "extraordinary medical expenses," the courts made the basis of
the distinction a question of fact.' Some of the factors accorded
weight were: (1) whether the expense was incurred at the sugges-
tion of a physician;' (2) whether the expense was "primarily" for
the prevention or mitigation of a particular physical or mental de-
fect;1" and (3) whether the expense was directly and proximately
related to the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of the particular disease." In most cases the courts allowed as de-
ductions only those travel expenses which, in all likelihood, would
not have been incurred but for the existence of an illness and the
taxpayer's obedience to the resulting medical advice. Those travel
expenses incurred in the improvement of one's "general" health-as
opposed to travel expenses necessitated by some specific condition-
were disallowed." Thus, by the time of the enactment of the 1954
Code, a taxpayer had to discharge a heavy burden of proof in
demonstrating that an expense which was normally personal had
taken on the characteristics of a "medical care" expense because it
was necessary for the alleviation or cure of a particular physical or
mental defect or disease. 3 As a result, the deduction of travel ex-
penses, including transportation, board, and lodging, was sustained
only in rare situations.
Section 213 (e) (1) (A) of the 1954 Code defines medical care
in language identical to that of section 23 (x) of the 1939 Code.
Another provision permits deduction of transportation expenses (not
travel) incurred "primarily for and essential to medical care. .. .,
'Bertha M. Rodgers, 25 T.C. 254, 260 (1955), aff'd, 241 F.2d 552 (sth Cir. 1957);
William B. Watkins, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 320, 323 (1954); Frances Hoffman, 17 T.C.
1380, 1385 (1952).
'Edward A. Havey, 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
"0L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580 (1949); Edward A. Havey, supra note 9.
"Ochs v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1952); Vincent P. Ring, 23 T.C. 950
(1955); Gunnar E. Erickson, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1045 (1954); L. Keever Stringham,
supra note 10; see also Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(x)-1 (d) (1) (1953). Additional factors
might include: (1) Was the treatment proximate in time to the onset, recurrence, or con-
tinuance of the disease? (Hollander v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1955); Frances
Hoffman, 17 T.C. 1380 (1952)); (2) What was the motive or purpose of the taxpayer?
(L. Keever Stringham, supra); (3) Was the taxpayer in the care of a physician where re-
located? (William H. Duff, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1305 (1953)); see generally Annot.,
37 A.L.R.2d 551 (1954), concerning medical expenses deductible for federal income tax
purposes.
"Samuel Dobkin, 15 T.C. 886 (1950); L. Keever Stringham, supra note 10; Martin W.
Keller, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685 (1949).
aThis construction of the 1939 Code was continued after 1954. See Embry v. Gray,
143 F. Supp. 603 (1956), appeal dismissed, 244 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1957); Stanley D.
Winderman, 32 T.C. 1197 (1959); Bertha M. Rodgers, 25 T.C. 254 (1955), aff'd, 241
F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1957); see also Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 307.
14 Section 213 of the 1954 Code allows as deductions in computing net income "the ex-
penses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for
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Also, the exception for "extraordinary medical expense" found in
section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Code was omitted in its 1954 counter-
part, section 262, which now provides that unless expressly author-
ized, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family
expenses."s When proposed by the Treasury, the 1954 changes were
intended to:
permit deduction of cost of transportation necessary for health but
not ordinary living expenses incurred during trip.
Overall effect of proposed changes is to 1. Liberalize and extend
relief in real hardship situations due to heavy medical expenses but
curb deduction of ordinary or luxury living expenses in guise of
medical costs.16
In approving these changes, committees of both houses of Congress
offered the following explanation:
Subsection (e) defines medical care to mean amounts paid for the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of diseases or for
the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body (in-
cluding amounts paid for accident or health insurance), or for trans-
portation primarily for and essential to medical care. The deduction
permitted for "transportation primarily for and essential to medical
care" clarifies existing law in that it specifically excludes deduction of
any meals and lodging while away from home receiving medical treat-
ment. For example, if a doctor prescribes that a patient must go to
Florida in order to alleviate specific chronic ailments proven injurious
to the health of the taxpayer, and the travel is prescribed for reasons
other than the general improvement of the patient's health, the cost
of the patient's transportation to Florida would be deductible but not
his living expenses while there. However, if a doctor prescribed
an appendectomy and the taxpayer chose to go to Florida for the opera-
tion not even his transportation costs would be deductible. The sub-
section is not intended otherwise to change the existing definitions of
medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent . Subdivision (e) (1) defines
"medical care" expenses as "amounts paid"
(A) for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body (includ-
ing amounts paid for accident or health insurance), or
(B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care referred to
in subparagraph (A).
1 In fact, the exact words of section 262 are: "Except as otherwise expressly provided
in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
16Hearings on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 Before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1954). The statement is contained in a document presented
by Marion B. Folsom, Undersecretary of the Treasury, at the opening of the Senate Finance
Committee hearings. See also S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954), stating: "A
new definition of 'medical expense' is provided which allows the deduction of only transpor-
tation expenses for travel prescribed for health, and not the ordinary living expenses incurred




medical care, to deny the cost of ordinary ambulance transportation
nor to deny the cost of food or lodging provided as part of a hospital
bill.
17
Although section 213 (e) (1) (B) mentions only transportation and
makes no express mention of the deductibility or nondeductibility of
the cost of meals and lodging, the Treasury was confident of the
Congressional intent. It issued regulations stating that:
Expenses paid for transportation primarily for and essential to the
rendition of the medical care are expenses paid for medical care.
However, an amount allowable as a deduction for "transportation
primarily for and essential to medical care" shall not include the cost
of any meals and lodging while away from home receiving medical
treatment. 8
Notwithstanding the language in the committee reports and the
Treasury Regulations, Taxpayer in the instant case was successful
before the Tax Court"9 and the Third Circuit0 in his contention
that section 213 did not deny the deductibility of the cost of
lodging if the expense would have been deductible under section
23 (x) of the 1939 Code. However, contemporaneously in Carasso,"
the Tax Court and the Second Circuit, after recourse to the legisla-
tive history of section 213, had disallowed lodging costs on substan-
tially similar facts. In view of the conflict between the circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court, reversing the Third
Circuit and holding in accord with the Second Circuit in Carasso,
stated that although transportation expenses incurred on a medi-
cally necessitated trip were deductible, the cost of lodging was not.
In reaching this result, the Court relied upon the legislative intent
as expressed in the committee reports.
17H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A60 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 219-20 (1954); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1337, supra at 4055, and S. Rep. No. 1622,
supra at 4666, where it is stated: "A new definition of 'medical expenses' is provided which
incorporates regulations under present law and also provides for the deduction of transporta-
tion expenses for travel prescribed for health, but not the ordinary living expenses incurred
during such a trip."
'STreas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e) (1) (IV) (1954).
1933 T.C. 155, 158 (1959): "In view of the clarity of the wording of Section 213 of
the 1954 Code, we see no reason to resort to Congressional history for its meaning."
20 2 8 9 F.2d 291 (1960). The Third Circuit affirmed and expanded the Tax Court opinion
by allowing the total apartment rental to be deducted; whereas, the Tax Court had allowed
only such proportion as was attributable to the individual taxpayer. The court characterized
the legislative history as ambiguous and accorded more weight to the fact that exact wording
of § 23 (x) was carried forward to § 213, concluding that the court's interpretations under
23 (x) were meant to be applicable under S 213.
"' 34 T.C. 1139 (1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961). In Carasso, the taxpayer,
recovering from a severe illness which had necessitated the removal of a major portion of his
stomach, was ordered by his physician to travel to Bermuda for convalescence. The Tax




At one time, recourse to legislative history"2 was improper unless
the statute under consideration was ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning." However, recent decisions encourage an examination of
the legislative background. For instance, in Harrison v. Northern
Trust Co.," when a court of appeals refused to examine legislative his-
tory because the "plain meaning" of the statute was unambiguous, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision. Judge Murphy stated: "[W] ords
are inexact tools at best and for that reason there is wisely no
rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no mat-
ter how 'clear the words may appear on superficial examination.'"3
Under the 1939 Code the courts allowed travel expenses as "medical
care" deductions with some reliance on legislative history," which
disclosed that subdivision (x) of section 23 was added because of
the "desirability of maintaining the present high level of public
health and morale." 7 It may be argued that the reenactment of the
same language in the 1954 Code without specifying the non-
deductibility of meals and lodging indicated Congressional approval
of the existing statutory construction. However, as noted above,
the 1954 Code's legislative history discloses that Congress was ad-
vised that the new definition of "medical care" was intended to
preclude deductions for the cost of lodging and board incurred on
trips medically necessitated." Indeed, the committee reports set forth
a hypothetical situation in which a taxpayer's ordinary living ex-
22 As the term "legislative history" is used here it refers to the passage of a particular
statute in the legislature, including reference to the debates, amendments, and committee re-
ports. The term does not refer to the history of those statutes which have dealt with the
subject matter. See Annot., 70 A.L.R. 5 (1931), concerning the use of constitutional or
legislative debates, committee reports, and the like as aids in the construction of a statute.
23 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 5, at 15-16
nn.13, 14 (1931).
24 317 U.S. 476 (1943).25 Id. at 479; see Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928),
in which Justice Holmes stated: "It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we
are not to resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience
than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."
See also United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 55 (1942); United States
v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444 (1955), in which Justice Frankfurter stated:
"And considering that the construction we have found seems plain, the so-called 'plain
meaning rule,' on which construction is from time to time rested also in this Court, likewise
makes further inquiry needless and indeed improper. But that rule has not dominated our
decisions."
26L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580, 583 (1949): "As the broad and comprehensive
language of this section is susceptible to a variety of conflicting interpretations, we feel im-
pelled, in order to determine the limits of its construction, to inquire into the Congressional
intent which lay behind the enactment of this legislation."
27S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1954); 1942-2 Cum. Bull. 504, 508.
28 See note 16 supra and accompanying text for statements by those officials in the
Treasury charged with introducing and explaining the proposed changes to Congress.
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penses were stated to be nondeductible although incurred on a
medically prescribed trip to Florida."
Although the committee reports may be occasionally "inartistic,"
their import makes inescapable the result in the instant case. The
reports do appear, however, to misconstrue what are ordinary living
expenses. Presumably, food and lodging costs incurred in travel are
disallowed as deductions because such expenses are ordinary living
expenses. Yet medically necessitated temporary travel can easily
involve food and lodging costs well above the "ordinary" costs of
such items to a taxpayer when he is at home. The committee reports
do not indicate that these factors were considered, and the Supreme
Court's decision may preclude their consideration by future courts.
For instance, had the taxpayer in Bilder known of the nondeducti-
bility of his Florida lodging costs, he might have been forced
by economic considerations to remain hospitalized in Newark-an
admittedly less desirable alternative. As a result of the decision,
taxpayers are encouraged to accept institutional facilities, because of
the deductibility of the expenses, even though other alternatives may
be more beneficial to them."
The court in the instant case found it unnecessary to consider the
Commissioner's alternative argument that section 262 allowed no
deduction for "personal, living, or family expenses . . . except as
otherwise expressly provided in this chapter" and that apart from
"transportation" expenses provided in section 213 (e) (1) (B), no
29 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
s Taxpayer's brief suggests the inequities that will follow the decision in two examples:
Example 1: Following nine operations for cancer at a hospital near his home,
Taxpayer A went to the University Hospital at Madison, Wisconsin for further
surgery. There, he was operated on daily for 26 consecutive days during which
he lost nearly 40 pounds. His condition both physically and emotionally was
poor. His attending physicians believed that the crowded conditions at the hos-
pital, the hospital fare, and the hospital atmosphere were all combining to re-
tard his recovery. Accordingly, arrangements were made to transfer Taxpayer
A to a quiet room in a nearby hotel from which the hospital could be reached
in five minutes time by ambulance. As a preliminary to the transfer, Taxpayer
A's wife was trained by his doctors on how to take care of him and what to
do in the event of an emergency. In the quieter, more pleasant (and less ex-
pensive) surroundings of the hotel, and with food of his choice delivered to
his room, there was a marked improvement in Taxpayer A's condition. He re-
mained at the hotel for an extended period during which he could not be
moved farther away because of the necessity to return to the hospital each
day for post-surgical treatment.
Example 2: After Taxpayer B became stricken with lung cancer, his local doc-
tors had done an "exploratory" and determined the case to be inoperable. Tax-
payer B thereupon traveled to the Cancer Research Center at Madison, Wiscon-
sin for treatment. The attending doctors at Madison wish to admit him to the
hospital, but there is no bed for him and a long waiting list of other cancer
patients ahead of him. Consequently, Taxpayer B stays at a nearby hotel and
travels back and forth daily by taxi for the drastic irradiation and Chemo-
therapy treatments, which have met with some measure of success at Madison.
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other express exception could be found in the statute. 1 If the
Supreme Court had accepted this argument, the entire concept of
deductible medical expenses would have been jeopardized because
of the general nature of section 213. The refusal to consider this
argument, therefore, leaves the general definition of medical care
contained in (a) of section 213 (e) ( 1 ) flexible. Those decisions which
are now discredited by Bilder in so far as they allowed lodging and
food costs as deductions will continue to provide the precedent
for distinguishing between expenses primarily "personal, living, or
family" and those deductible because incurred for the "diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease. " Furthermore,
the deductibility of transportation expenses under section 213 (e)
(1) (B) will require a showing that such expenses were directly and
proximately related to medical care." When considered from the
standpoint of historical policy underlying medical deductions, per-
haps the Bilder decision represents a restriction detrimental to the
taxpayer; nevertheless, the result is explicable in light of the com-
mittee reports accompanying the legislation. 3
Ronald M. Holley
Water Rights-Spanish Land Grants-
Appurtenant Irrigation Rights
Defendants, who claimed title under original Spanish and Mexican
land grants, owned land which they alleged was susceptible of irriga-
tion with water from the Rio Grande River, although such right
was not specifically set out in their grants. The State of Texas, in a
class action, representing the rights of all appropriators of the water,
claimed that there were -no riparian rights of irrigation appurtenant
to Defendants' grants. Held: Rights of irrigation are not appurtenant
to original Spanish and Mexican land grants unless expressly included.
Valmont Plantations v. State, -Tex.-, 355 S.W.2d 502 (1962)
(adopting opinion of court of civil appeals, 346 S.W.2d 853 (1961)).
In general there are two broad classes of water rights in Texas:
(1) those given to the general public, and (2) those given to specific
" 369 U.S. at 451 n.9.
3 In Carasso, following a finding that the taxpayer's travel to Bermuda was medically
prompted, the Tax Court allowed transportation expenses stating: "We hold that the ex-
penses of the Bermuda trip, except for hotel and meals, are deductible." Max Carasso, 34
T.C. 1139, 1141 (1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961). In the Bilder case, the Com-
missioner had acquiesced in the Tax Court's allowance of transportation expenses. 1960 Int.
Rev. Bull. No. 16, at 9; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e) (1) (10) (1960).
" For a subsequent case, see Leo Cohn, 38 T.C. 387 (1962).
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individuals. The latter class consists primarily of (a) riparian rights'
which "arise out of the ownership of land through or by which a
stream of water flows,"' and (b) appropriation rights which are
acquired by compliance with the appropriation statutes. However,
the mere fact that land is of a riparian character does -not always give
rise to appurtenant riparian rights." It is well settled that the rights
of those holding title under grants from prior sovereigns are con-
trolled by the laws in effect when the grants were made.'
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the Spanish law of waters
in effect when the Spanish and Mexican titles were issued to lands
situated in the former Mexican states of Coahuila, Texas, and
Tamaulipas was the law as found in Las Siete Partidas.' Although the
Partidas do not discuss how individuals acquire the right to irrigate
with river waters," the central concept of Hispanic-American water
law was that all water belonged to the sovereign Therefore "it is
a legitimate conclusion ... that no one, without the permission of
the Prince (could) conduct public waters to his lands for irrigation,
especially in this New Spain. . . ."' Additional evidence that Spanish
'See Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 159, 168 (1930):
Generally speaking, riparian rights are:
1) Use of the water for general purposes, as bathing, domestic use, etc.
2) To warf out to navigability.
3) Access to navigable waters.
'Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 469, 86 S.W. 733, 735 (1905); Matagorda
Canal Co. v. Markham Irr. Co., 154 S.W. 1176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7467-7621 (1954).
" See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7619 (1954): "Nothing in this chapter [Use
of State Water] shall be construed as a recognition of any riparian right in the owner of
any lands the title to which shall have passed out of the State of Texas subsequent to the
first day of July, A.D. 1895."
aIn Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S.W.2d 438, 442 (1932), the court stated:
"The rule is an elementary one that, in determining the rights of holders of title under
Mexican grants, the laws of Mexico in effect when the grants were made control." See also
State v. Balli, 144 Tex. 195, 190 S.W.2d 71 (1945); State v. Grubstake Inv. Ass'n, 117
Tex. 53, 297 S.W. 202 (1927); State v. Sais, 47 Tex. 307, 318 (1877); State v. Cuellar,
47 Tex. 295, 305 (1877); Harris v. O'Connor, 185 S.W.2d 993 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
error ref. w.o.m.
'State v. Balli, 144 Tex. 195, 190 S.W.2d 71 (1945); Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex.
213, 56 S.W.2d 438 (1932); Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S.W.2d 404 (1932);
State v. Grubstake Inv. Ass'n, 117 Tex. 53, 297 S.W. 202 (1927); Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex.
82, 286 S.W. 458 (1926); see Cox, The Texas Board of Water Engineers, 7 Texas L. Rev.
86, 88 (1928).
'1 Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights § 573 (1912); Davenport, Riparian vs.
Appropriative Rights: The Texas Experience, in Water Law, Texas Conferences 138, 152
(1952-1954); Davenport & Canales, Law of Flowing Waters, 8 Baylor L. Rev. 139, 162
(1956).
'Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 371, 17 Pac. 453, 456 (1888); State v. Red River Valley Co.,
51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421, 428 (1946); Dobkins, The Spanish Element in Texas Water
Law 98 (1959).
'0fiate, Memorandum on Rights in Waters of the Lower Rio Grande in the Spanish
Colonial and Early Mexican Periods 16 (1959), prepared for the state's attorneys in the
principal case by Lic. Santiago Ofiate, member of the Bar of the Republic of Mexico. This
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and Mexican law did not recognize the legal consequences of riparian
ownership inherent in common law doctrine is the fact that the use
of the streams was not limited to riparian owners but also extended
to nonriparian title holders."
Regardless of the Spanish history, because of dictum in the case
of Motl v. Boyd,"5 it was believed prior to the instant case that
insofar as Mexican law was interpreted in Texas, the rights of
riparian owners were recognized even though not expressly set out
in the original land grant. However, the courts of this state had not
decided whether Spanish and Mexican land grants had appurtenant
irrigation rights similar to the common law riparian right involved
in the principal case.1' Indeed, there is highly regarded opinion to
the effect "that when a title of land did not mention waters, a
right of water was never considered to exist, solely by reason of
proximity or accession, and, therefore the topographical location of
riparians did not give such lands any (riparian) right."" Neverthe-
less, the dissenters in the principal case maintained that the Motl
dictum, 4 by virtue of its long standing, should have constituted a
"rule of property.""
In the Valmont case, the majority opinion of the court of civil
appeals,". which was adopted by the supreme court, 7 followed the
Texas authorities concerning judicial consideration of dicta." Justice
work cites Recopilaci6n de Leyes de Indias, law 4, tit. XII, Bk. 4; law 8, tit. XII, Bk. 4;
law 18, tit. XII, Bk. 4; de la Vega, Reglamento General de las Medidas de las Aguas, Pub-
licado En El Ano de 1761, as translated in Collection of Roman, Spanish and Mexican Laws
and Commentaries 110 (1960), prepared by the state's attorneys.
One nineteenth century Spanish writer reported that the riparian owners along small
streams did have what today might be called "riparian rights." See White & Wilson, The
Flow and Underflow of Moll v. Boyd-The Conclusion, 9 Sw. L.J. 377, 414 (1955), quoting
Escriche, Of Small Streams and Riparian Rights. But what may be said about small streams
is not necessarily applicable to all flowing waters, and Escriche's work has been criticized by
a number of modern authorities as being more opinion than an accurate statement of the
prevailing doctrine. See Dobkins, op. cit. supra note 8, at 146; White & Wilson, supra at
414 n.138; Wiel, Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of Watercourses in the
Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 Calif. L. Rev. 245, 256 (1918). For a discussion of
the divergent views of five Texas authorities on water law concerning the extent of the
vested riparian right as it relates to the use of water for irrigation, see Hutchins, The
Texas Law of Water Rights 145 (1961).
1i 1 Kinney, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 580.
" 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458, 465 (1926): "[W]e believe we are clearly warranted in
saying that, in so far as the Mexican Law in Texas is concerned, it was one which distinctly
recognized the rights of riparian owners of land."
1" 346 S.W.2d at 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961): "We assert that no Texas Court has hereto-
fore been called upon to decide whether Spanish and Mexican land grants have appurtenant
irrigation rights similar to the common law riparian right."
13 Ofiate, op. cit. supra note 9, at 22.
" See quotation note 11 supra.
'5355 S.W.2d at 503 (Tex. Sup. Ct.); 346 S.W.2d at 882 (Tex. Civ. App.).
1"346 S.W.2d at 853.
'7355 S.W.2d at 502.
"Luttes v. State, 159 Tex. 500, 324 S.W.2d 167 (1958); State ex rel. Childress v. School
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Pope said, "We do not presume to overrule the [Motl] case .... We
are not, however, bound by dicta . .,." In rejecting the highly
criticized "rule" of the Motl case, 0 the principal case at long last
seems to square the Texas law with its Spanish history. The dictum
in the Motl case to the effect that land fronting on a river has riparian
rights apparently was based upon the assumption that because land
in Texas was divided by the Spanish into one of three classes
(irrigable, arable, or pasture), "irrigable" land had an implied right
to irrigate similar to common law riparian rights. 1 However, all
lands adjacent to rivers were not classified as "irrigable," nor did
all irrigable lands have appurtenant irrigation rights. This idea
behind the Motl dictum had been promulgated earlier in Tolle v.
Correth," in which the Texas Supreme Court stated: "The fact that
lands were valuable in the ratio of their irrigable qualities, and that
the irrigable lands were not subject to monopoly, is conclusive that
the government in granting the lands, granted the irrigable rights
and privileges thereof."2 Furthermore, the Spaniard, Lasso de la
Vega, writing in the mid-eighteenth century, is said to have written
that in granting land, if the waters "either form a part of it, or
are necessary to its enjoyment, then the waters and their sources are
also granted.""4 The language of the Tolle case2' and the dictum in
the Mol case" necessarily appear to be in error because, "as a matter
of pure statutory construction, the use of such terms as 'irrigable,'
'suitable for irrigation,' and 'facility of irrigation' in those very
early land laws did not mean and was not intended to mean all
lands, and lands only, riparian to rivers, streams and similar water
sources." 7 Such phrases "did not have any reference to whether or
Trustees, 150 Tex. 238, 239 S.W.2d 777, 782 (1951); Mitchell v. Town of Refugio, 265
S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref.; Maruska v. Missouri K. & T.R., 10 S.W.2d
211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error ref.
19 346 S.W.2d at 879.
" Dobkins, op. cit. supra note 8, at 145; White & Wilson, The Flow 01 Underflow of
Mol v. Boyd, 9 Sw. L.J. 1, 2 (1955); see McKnight, Book Review, Miss. Valley Historical
Rev. 710, 711 (1960): "Although this case still stands as authority, its critics argue (with
reason) that the court there misapprehended the Hispano-Mexican law of water, thus
wrongly reading it into oblivion."
'tMotl. v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458, 465 (1926).
2231 Tex. 362 (1868).
2 3 1d. at 365. Note that Dobkins, op. cit. supra note 8, at 135, states that the Tolle case
was concerned with the use of the waters of the Comal River in New Braunfels, Texas.
However, neither the Tolle case itself nor Mrs. Dobkins state the origin of the title involved.
24 Translated by Davenport, supra note 7, at 153. See also Davenport & Canales, supra
note 7, at 17. However, see note 31 infra and accompanying text.
25 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
26 See quotation note 11 supra.




not the land fronted on a stream";"s and conversely, "the mere fact
that a survey fronts on a stream does not determine that all, or any
part of the survey is in fact 'irrigable.' ,2 Moreover, the language
by de la Vega quoted above3" is not completely accurate, since the
quotation is not taken in its full context."
The dissenters in both the court of civil appeals2 and the supreme
court" offered no real justification for their defense of Motl v. Boyd
as an inviolable rule of property. Although the Motl case has been
cited nearly eighty times, it has never been cited for the particular
problem in point in the Valmont case, 4 i.e., whether or not Spanish
land grants carried appurtenant water rights. It may be true that
the general thought on the subject was that the dictum in Motl was
controlling on the issue. However, there has been no judicial reliance
on this belief and certainly there is no reason to raise such a belief
2 Wilson, Reappraisal of Motl v. Boyd, in Water Law, Texas Conference 40, 43 (195 5).
Wilson also notes that the Spanish used an irrigating ditch system that ran parallel to the
river so that the tracts got their water from their relationship to the ditch and not to the
river. Id. at 39-40.
"s Walker, Legal History of the Riparian Right of Irrigation in Texas Since 1836, in
Water Law, Texas Conference 43 (1959). Walker indicates that the Tolle case, besides being
a most confusing opinion, was decided by the "military court" during the reconstruction
period, and therefore, in the view of many, is of small precedential value. Id. at 50.
30 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
" See de ]a Vega, op. cit. supra note 9, at 113: "3. Pero si en la concession de las
tierras, se conceden juntamente las aguas sus originales, por considerarse partes 6 fructos
de las dichas tierras mercenadas, es doctrina del padre Avendafio nuestro Regnicola en su
Thesauro Indico (6) .... "
But compare (1) the translation in Hamilton, Mexican Law 111 (1882), as quoted by
the court in the principal case at 867 (Tex. Civ. App.): "But if in concessions of lands,
concessions are made jointly of the waters originating upon it, as appurtenances of the lands
granted, it is a doctrine laid down by Padre Avendano in his Thesauro Indico . . ." and
(2) the translation in Collection of Roman, Spanish and Mexican Laws and Commentaries
114 (1960), prepared by the state's attorneys: "3. But if in the granting of lands, the
waters originating on them are conceded jointly with them by virtue of being considered as
parts or fruits of the lands granted, the applicable doctrine is that of Father Avendano, our
native writer, in his Thesaurus Indicus (6) . . ." with (1) the translation by Davenport,
supra note 7, at 153: "either form a part of it, or are necessary to its enjoyment, then the
waters and their sources are also granted . . . " and (2) the full translation by Davenport &
Canales, supra note 7, at 171: "3. But, in granting the land, if the waters either form
part of it, or are essential to its enjoyment; then the water and its sources are also granted;
this is the doctrine of Father Avendano, our Royal Authority on land law, as stated in his
Thesauro Indico .... " (Emphasis added.)
a2 346 S.W.2d at 882.
33355 S.W.2d at 503.
4 Cf. San Antonio River Authority v. Lewis, - Tex. -, 363 S.W.2d 444 (1962),
involving Spanish land grants containing express grants of irrigation. In Lewis the court of
civil appeals, 343 S.W.2d 475, 479 (1960), in dictum had recognized an individual's right
to extract irrigation water without an express grant. On the same day as the Valmont case,
the Texas Supreme Court reversed, 5 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 255 (1962), but later withdrew its
opinion. Subsequent to Valmont, the court in a substituted opinion affirmed the court of
civil appeals in Lewis. However, the court reaffirmed the Valmont rule that "while the
sovereign could, indeed, grant the [river] beds to individuals, it will not be presumed to
have done so . . . in the absence of direct and certain evidence that such was its intention."
363 S.W.2d at 447-48.
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to the status of a rule of property. The Valmont decision has at last
cleared the waters muddied by the Motl mess.
Fred Kolodey
Labor Law-Section 301 (a) Labor-Management
Relations Act-State Court Application
of Federal Substantive Law
Employer discharged one of its employees for unsatisfactory work.
The employee's union, in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement it had with Employer, called a strike to protest the
discharge. Employer sought damages in a state court for losses caused
by the strike. Held: Although section 301 (a) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 19471 gives competent state courts juris-
diction concurrent with federal district courts to hear actions arising
out of breaches of collective bargaining contracts, federal substan-
tive law must be applied in both courts. Local 174, Teamsters Union
v. Lucas Flour Co., 368 U.S. 95 (1962).
Section 301 (a) was enacted to give federal district courts juris-
diction over actions involving breaches of collective bargaining agree-
ments without the parties having to establish the normal jurisdic-
tional amount or diversity of citizenship requirements.! Federal
courts have interpreted jurisdictional and substantive law problems
created by section 301 (a)" in four ways: the section provides for (1)
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over actions involving
collective bargaining agreements, (2) an exclusive state substantive
law, (3) concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts, but the
state may apply the state law, and (4) concurrent jurisdiction in
state and federal courts but creates an exclusive federal substan-
tive law.
The first interpretation would establish a uniform federal law for
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. The opinions'
161 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizen-
ship of the parties.
'Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
a See note 1 supra for the wording of the section.
'United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953); Milk Drivers
v. Gillaspie Milk Prod., 203 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1953); Textile Workers, C.I.O. v. Artesia
Mills, 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951); Shirley-Herman Co., Inc. v. International Hod Car-
riers Union, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950); Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical
State Employees, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950).
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which construed the section in this manner reasoned that Congress
had intended the section to create a new, federal, substantive right,
and, therefore, whenever a section 301 (a) action was brought in a
state court, the defendant could properly remove the suit to a
federal district court which exerted exclusive jurisdiction." The
second interpretation meant that when diversity was lacking, a
federal district court should not accept jurisdiction of an arbitra-
tion action, since the state substantive law was exclusive.! That view
was based upon the theory that the suit did not violate a contract,'
that a federal question was not involved,' and that the bringing of
the suit did not violate a collective bargaining agreement.! The
fullest development of the thesis occurred in Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills." The third interpreta-
tion of section 301 (a) stated that the federal courts were given
concurrent jurisdiction with competent state courts to entertain
suits involving breaches of collective bargaining agreements, t and,
therefore, the federal courts should apply state law rather than a
federal substantive law. The fourth interpretation, i.e., that there
is concurrent jurisdiction but an exclusive federal substantive law,
has been approved by the Supreme Court in the principal case.
Previously, in Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers," a federal dis-
trict court had held that when plaintiff's labor union represented
employees in an industry affecting commerce, removal to the federal
district court on the basis of a federal question was proper even
though the federal question was not fully alleged in the complaint."
The theory underlying the Fay case was that a well-pleaded com-
plaint would necessarily assert a federal question."
'Ibid.
0 Bussey v. Local 3, Plumbers Union, 286 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961); Tutt v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Fireman, 272 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1959); Peterson v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Fireman, 272 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1959); Matter of Arbitration between Hall
and Sperry Gyroscope Co., 183 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Wamsutta Mills v. Pollack,
180 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); International News Serv. v. Gregory, 160 F. Supp. 5
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334
(S.D. Cal. 1953).
'Wamsutta Mills v. Pollock, supra note 6.
' Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
'Matter of Arbitration between Hall and Sperry Gyroscope Co., 183 F. Supp. 891
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
10353 U.S. 448 (1957); see text accompanying note 20 infra.
" Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S.
437 (1955); United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1957); International Ladies Garment Workers v. Jay Ann, Inc., 228 F.2d 632 (5th Cir.
1956); Oil Workers v. Mercury Oil Ref. Co., 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951).
1298 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
1d. at 280.
1 IA Moore, Federal Practice 5 0.167(7), at 1010 (1961): "[A] suit may be removed
where the real nature of the claim asserted in the complaint is federal, irrespective of whether
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In the first case in which section 301 (a) was considered by the
Supreme Court-Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp."-the Court held that section 301(a)
did not give the federal courts jurisdiction over suits for wages
brought by a union.16 Viewing the legislative history" of the sec-
tion, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to burden
the federal courts with bargaining disputes and that an employee as
an individual could rely upon state courts to protect his rights. One
concurring opinion" said that in suits under section 301 (a), a federal
court should apply state law only if it was not contrary to the federal
policies stated in the Labor Management Relations Act."
21In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills" and two companion cases,
the Court took the position that the federal courts had jurisdiction
to decree specific performance of an arbitration agreement. The
underlying theme in these three decisions indicated the desire of
the courts to establish a uniform body of labor law. 2" By holding
that section 301 (a) was more than jurisdictional, the Court effec-
tively created rights based on a uniform federal labor policy. This
view evolved from federal court decisions enforcing collective bar-
gaining agreements. 2'3 The Court, however, left unanswered the ques-
tion of whether state courts had concurrent jurisdiction.
The first court to render a decision on the question of concurrent
jurisdiction was the California Supreme Court in McCarroll v. Los
Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters," which held that
section 301(a) did not expressly or impliedly exclude a state court
it is characterized, or where the plaintiff inadvertently, mistakenly or fraudulently conceals
the federal question that would necessarily have appeared if the complaint had been well
pleaded."
" 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
16 This approach was followed in Textile Workers v. Cone Mill Corp., 166 F. Supp. 654
(N.D.N.C. 1958), but was held to be no longer authoritative as precedent in Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, - U.S. -, 83 Sup. Ct. 267 (1962).
17 Hearings on S. 55 and S. Res. 22 Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. I-IV (1947).
" 348 U.S. at 464. In that opinion Justice Reed concurred on the ground that the dis-
pute was not a violation of a contract between a union and an employer.
"
9 See Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
20353 U.S. 448 (1957).
" Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 550 (1957); General Elec.
Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
"Oil Workers v. Delta Ref. Co., 277 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1960); Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959); Textile Workers v. Cone
Mill Corp., 268 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1959); Minkoff v. Scanton Frocks, Inc., 172 F. Supp.
870 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Contra, Mississippi Valley Elec. Co. v. Local 130, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 278 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1960); see Comment, 34 So. Cal. L. Rev. 63 (1960).
" Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1959).
2449 Cal. 2d 49, 315 P.2d 322 (1957). Another case subsequent to the McCarroll




from jurisdiction. The court based its decision upon the permissive
language of section 301 (a): "[S]uits for violation of a contract
between an employer and a labor organization representing em-
ployees in an industry affecting commerce . ..may be brought in
any district court."2 (Emphasis added.)
In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, the United States Supreme
Court answered the question of whether state jurisdiction in a
labor dispute was preempted by federal law. The Court held that
an action arising under section 301 (a) did not divest the state court
of jurisdiction. The Dowd Box case followed the general rule of
federal procedure that concurrent jurisdiction will be granted when
it is not expressly excluded by or incompatible in its exercise with
the nature of the case. 7 The Court, however, did not decide in
Dowd Box whether federal substantive law was exclusive.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court accepted the fourth view
above, i.e., that the federal courts have not preempted a qualified
state court from exercising jurisdiction in a section 301 (a) dispute."
However, the Court held that regardless of which court decided the
action, federal substantive law was to be applied. This latter rule
indicates that the Court, realizing the dimensions of the issues raised
in suits covered by section 301 (a), determined that such subject
matter must be directed by a uniform federal labor policy. The
courts will not now be faced with conflicting state and federal con-
cepts, since the former must give way to the principles of federal labor
law. The Court noted that the Dowd Box case had not specifically
decided whether a state court should apply federal law in exercising
jurisdiction over section 301 (a) litigation.
The principal case illustrates the difference between preemption
of jurisdiction and preemption of substantive law. It is important
that there be an effective uniform policy in the area of labor-
management relations. Therefore, federal substantive law must be
applied in both state and federal courts. Section 301 (a), as inter-
preted, creates a reverse "Erie Railroad""2 problem, because state
2161 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
2'368 U.S. 502 (1962).
27Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178 (1944); Missouri v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924);
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884).
" The Dowd Box decision upheld concurrent jurisdiction in federal and state courts
but failed to pass upon the question of whether federal substantive law was preemptive.
Hence, the Court disclaimed any approval of the Fay case which was based upon (1) con-
current jurisdiction and (2) exclusive federal substantive law. However, the principal case,
along with the Dowd Box case, established that the Fay case had preempted state law.
29368 U.S. at 101 (1962).
S"In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court held that in matters of
substantive law, if the cause of action arose under state law, the federal courts were bound
by the decisions of the highest state court.
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courts must now follow and apply federal substantive law. The
approach taken is the best way to establish a practical, uniform pro-
cedure for handling cases involving breaches of collective bargaining
agreements and simultaneously utilize the dual system of federal-
state courts.
Gary Nordheimer
